[October 27 - November 5, 1922]
From V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th English Edition,
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966
Vol. 33, pp. 400-409.
Translated from the Russian
Edited by David Skvirsky
and George Hanna
INTERVIEW WITH ARTHUR RANSOME, MANCHESTER GUARD- |
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First Version . . . . . .
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1. Question. I find considerable economic activity; everybody is buying and selling, and evidently, a new trading class is arising. My question is -- how is it that the Nepman is not, and shows no signs of aspiring to become, a political force?
   
Answer. Your first question reminded me of a conversation I had long, long ago, in London. It was on a Saturday night. I was taking a stroll with a friend; that was some twenty years ago.[131] The streets were thronged. Traders were lined all along the curbs, and their stalls were lit up by small metal tubes, filled with naphtha, or something of that sort. The lights were very pretty. The traffic in the streets was really extraordinary. Everybody was buying or selling.
   
In Russia at that time there was a trend that we called Economism. By this rather slangy term we meant the childish vulgarisation of Marx's views on historical materialism. My friend was an Economist, and he at once began to show off his knowledge. This extraordinary economic activity, he argued, should create a desire for political power. I laughed at this interpretation of Marx. The abundance of small traders and their extremely lively activities, I said, do not prove in the least that this class is a great economic force, from which one could infer a desire for "political power". London, probably, became the world's commercial centre, both economic and political, in a somewhat more complicated way than my friend imagined,
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and the London street traders, their remarkable activity notwithstanding, were rather far from being a "political" force, and even from the desire to become one.
   
I am afraid that your question as to why our Nepmen (i.e., street traders? petty hucksters?) "show no signs of aspiring to become a political force" will raise a smile here; and our answer will be -- for the very same reason that the Saturday night crowd buying and selling in the streets of London did not, in Britain, "show signs of aspiring to become a political force".
   
2. Question. I get the impression that in Russia, today, buying and selling and barter are highly profitable, whereas production is possible only in very rare cases. Buying and selling and barter are in the hands of the Nepmen. In most cases profitable production is conducted on a small scale, and is in the hands of private individuals. Unprofitable production is in the hands of the state. My question is -- does this not presage a continuous increase in the economic power of the Nepmen and a continuous diminution of the power of the state?
   
Answer. I am afraid that you formulate your second question also from an almost Economist angle in the sense indicated above. It was Bastiat, I think, who seriously held the opinion that "the ancient Greeks and Romans lived by plunder". The "economic" question as to where the loot obtained by the people who lived by plunder came from did not trouble him very much.
   
You "get the impression that in Russia, today, buying and selling and barter are highly profitable, whereas production is possible only in very rare cases".
   
I was very surprised to read such a conclusion drawn from observation of what goes on in the streets of Moscow. I thought to myself -- what about the millions and millions of Russian peasants? The fact that they sow crops is not a rare, or very rare case, but the commonest case in Russia, is it not? Is it not "even" commoner than the "buying and selling" of the Nepmen? And, probably, peasant production is not only "possible" in Russia, but extremely "profitable", is it not? If it were not so, how could our peasants have obtained the means to pay the tax in kind, amounting to hundreds of millions of poods of grain, which they have already delivered to the government so very quickly and easily? How is one to explain the universal acceleration
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of building activity observed by everybody, both in town and country, throughout boundless Russia?
   
Does not the questioner take for "highly profitable selling and barter" the petty trade in which a small trader sometimes makes millions and millions of profits in depreciated Russian currency, when on the free market a million rubles is worth less than a ruble was before? It is scarcely possible to slip into such an error, for our government is now -- has been for the last few months already -- striking out the "superfluous" noughts of our paper currency.[132] One day the figure is a million million; four noughts are struck out and it becomes a hundred million. The state does not become richer as a result of this operation, but it is very strange to assume that it "becomes weaker", for this operation is an obvious step towards stabilising the currency, and the Nepmen are beginning to see that the ruble is becoming stabilised; this was to be seen in the summer, for example. The Nepmen are beginning to understand that the "striking out" of noughts will continue, and I doubt whether their "aspiration to become a political force" will hinder it.
   
To return to the question of production. In this country the land belongs to the state. The small peasants who occupy the land are paying the tax splendidly. Industrial production -- in so-called light industry -- is obviously reviving; and this production is partly in the hands of the state and managed by its employees, and partly in the hands of lessees.
   
Thus, there are no grounds for anticipating "a continuous diminution of the power of the state".
   
You must draw a distinction not between production and trade, but between production in light industry and that in heavy industry. The latter is really unprofitable, and this is actually creating serious difficulties for the country. Of this, more below.
   
3. Question. It is being hinted that an attempt is to be made (by means of taxation) to compel the Nepmen to subsidise industry. My question is -- will not this merely result in a rise in prices and increased profits for the Nepmen, which will indirectly create the necessity of raising wages -- thus causing a return to the former situation?
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Answer. The government has at its command hundreds of millions of poods of grain. That being the case, it is wrong to anticipate that taxes will "merely " result in a rise in prices. The taxes will also provide us with revenues, obtained from the Nepmen and manufacturers, which will be used for industry, particularly heavy industry.
   
4. Question. Judging by usual capitalist standards, the economic situation should be worse. Judging by communist standards, the situation should also be worse (decline of heavy industry). And yet, everybody I meet admits that his conditions are better than they were a year ago. Evidently, something is taking place that neither capitalist nor communist ideology allows for. Both presuppose progress. But what if, instead of progressing, we are receding? My question is -- is it not possible that we are not marching forward to new prosperity, but are reverting to the old conditions? Is it not possible that Russia is going back to the period of agricultural production approximately commensurate with her needs, and to a brisk home trade only slightly affected by foreign imports? Is not such a period conceivable under the proletarian dictatorship as it was formerly under the feudal dictatorship?
   
Answer. Let us first "judge" by "usual capitalist standards". Throughout the summer our ruble remained stable. This is an obvious sign of improvement. Furthermore, the revival of peasant production and of light industry is beyond doubt. This, too, is an improvement. Lastly, the State Bank has obtained a net revenue of no less than 20,000,000 gold rubles (this is at the lowest estimate; actually, it obtained a larger sum). A small sum, but the improvement is beyond doubt. A small sum, but it undoubtedly marks the beginning of an increase in the funds available for heavy industry.
   
To proceed. Let us now judge by communist standards. All the three circumstances enumerated above are assets also from the communist viewpoint, for in this country political power is in the hands of the workers. The step towards the stabilisation of the ruble, the revival of peasant production and light industry and the first profits obtained by the State Bank (i.e., the state) are all assets from the communist viewpoint too.
   
How is it that although capitalism is the antithesis of communism, certain circumstances are assets from the two opposite viewpoints? It is because one possible way to
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proceed to communism is through state capitalism, provided the state is controlled by the working class. This is exactly the position in the "present case".
   
The decline of heavy industry is a loss to us. The first profits obtained by the State Bank and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade mark the beginning of an improvement in this field, too. The difficulties here are enormous; but the situation is by no means hopeless.
   
Let us proceed further. Is it possible that we are receding to something in the nature of a "feudal dictatorship"? It is utterly impossible, for although slowly, with interruptions, taking steps backward from time to time, we are still making progress along the path of state capitalism, a path that leads us forward to socialism and communism (which is the highest stage of socialism), and certainly not back to feudalism.
   
Foreign trade is growing; the ruble is becoming more stable, although the progress is not altogether without interruptions; there is an obvious revival of industry in Petrograd and Moscow; a small, a very small beginning has been made in accumulating state funds for the purpose of assisting heavy industry, and so on, and so forth. All this shows that Russia is not receding, but advancing, although, I repeat, very slowly, and not without interruption.
   
5. Question. Or are we witnessing a deplorable squandering of capital that should be utilised in production?
   
Answer. This question has already been answered in the foregoing.
   
6. Question. In addition to these questions The Manchester Guardian would be interested to obtain direct from you a refutation of the rumours now freely circulating in Moscow that the ration system will be reintroduced this winter and that all Nepman stocks are to be requisitioned.
   
Answer. I readily affirm that the rumours to the effect that we intend to revert to the ration system or that we intend to "requisition all Nepman stocks" are groundless.
   
They are fairy-tales, nothing more. We are not contemplating anything of the sort.
   
Nothing of the sort is conceivable in present-day Russia.
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These rumours are being maliciously circulated by people who are very angry with us, but are not very clever.
   
7. Question. Lastly, am I right in assuming that the agreement with Urquhart has not been finally rejected, but has only been shelved until normal, friendly relations have been established with the British Government?
   
Answer. You are absolutely right about Urquhart. I shall repeat what I recently told Farbman.[*] We have not finally rejected the proposal for a concession to Urquhart. We have rejected it only for the political reasons we have publicly announced. In our press we have started a discussion of all the pros and cons. And we hope that after this discussion we shall arrive at a definite opinion on both the political and economic aspects.
Yours,
   
November 5, 1922
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN CORRESPONDENT[130]
FIRST VERSION
Lenin
Published in The Manchester |
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page 406
   
* See pp. 383-89 of this volume. --Ed. [Transcriber's Note: See Lenin's "Interview Given to Michael Farbman, Observer and Manchester Guardian Correspondent". -- DJR]
Written between October 27 |
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Published according to |
Notes on |
page 531
[130]
Arthur Ransome, Manchester Guardian correspondent, came to Soviet Russia in October 1922 with the express purpose of interviewing Lenin. On October 26 he was asked to write down the questions that he wanted answered. On the next day Ransome wrote seven questions which he sent to Lenin.
[131]
Lenin and his wife Nadezhda Krupskaya lived in London from April 1902 to April 1903. The friend that Lenin mentions is K. M. Takhtarev, a Social-Democrat, member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class and one of the leaders of Economism.
page 532
19th and beginning of the 20th century. The Economists incorrectly assessed the relation between economics and politics and belittled the role of the political revolutionary struggle. They said that the working class should confine itself to an economic struggle for higher wages, better working conditions and so forth, maintaining that the political struggle was a matter for the liberal bourgeoisie. They rejected the idea that the party of the working class plays the leading role, that socialist political consciousness must be brought into the working-class movement. They thereby cleared the road for bourgeois ideology. Economism held out the threat of steering the proletariat away from the road of revolution and making it politically dependent on the bourgeoisie. This trend was completely routed ideologically by Lenin.
[p. 400]
[132]
On October 24, 1922, the Council of People's Commissars passed a decision to put into circulation banknotes dated 1923. Under the new decision, signed by Lenin, one 1923 ruble was equal to a million rubles of the banknotes that had been removed from circulation or one hundred 1922 rubles.
[p. 402]
Lenin received Ransome in the evening of November 3. They spoke of the parliamentary elections in Britain and the fascist coup in Italy, but mostly the talk was around the questions submitted by Ransome. Lenin said that he had not yet answered all the questions, but promised to do so before Ransome left the country. On Sunday, November 5, Lenin wrote his answers to all of Ransome's seven questions.
[p. 400]
The Economists were representatives of an opportunist trend in the Russian Social-Democratic movement of the close of the