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    Comrade Lenin read the resolution adopted by the Central Committee at the previous meeting. He stated that the resolution had been adopted with two dissenting votes. If the dissident comrades wished to make a statement, a discussion could be held; meanwhile he continued with the motives of the resolution.

    If the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties were to break with their policy of conciliation, a compromise with them could be proposed. The proposal bad been made, but those parties had obviously rejected the compromise.* On the other hand, by that time it had become definitely clear that the masses were following the Bolsheviks. That had been before the Kornilov revolt. Lenin cited election returns from Petrograd and Moscow as evidence. The Kornilov revolt had pushed the masses still more decisively to the side of the Bolsheviks. The alignment of forces at the Democratic Conference. The position was clear -- either Kornilov's dictatorship or the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorer strata of the peasantry. The Party could not be guided by the temper of the masses because it was changeable and incalculable; the Party must be guided by an objective anal-

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ysis and an appraisal of the revolution. The masses had put their trust in the Bolsheviks and demanded deeds from them and not words, a decisive policy both in the struggle against the war and in the struggle against economic ruin. If the political analysis of the revolution were taken as the basis, it would be perfectly clear that even anarchic outbursts confirmed that.

    Lenin went onto analyse the situation in Europe and showed that revolution would be even more difficult in Europe than in Russia; if matters had gone as far as a revolt in the navy in such a country as Germany, there too they must already have gone very far. Certain objective data on the international situation showed that by acting at that moment the Bolsheviks would have all proletarian Europe on their side; he showed that the bourgeoisie wanted to surrender Petrograd. That could only be prevented by the Bolsheviks taking over Petrograd. The obvious conclusion from all this was -- the armed uprising was on the order of the day as was stated in the resolution of the Central Committee.

    It would be better to draw practical conclusions from the resolution after hearing the reports of representatives from the centres.

    From a political analysis of the class struggle in Russia and in Europe there emerged the necessity to pursue the most determined and most active policy, which could be only the armed uprising.

  [80] The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) held an enlarged meeting at the Lesnovskaya District Council in Petrograd

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with Kalinin in the chair) on October 16 (29), 1917. It heard Lenin's report on the C.C. October 10 (23) resolution calling for an armed uprising. Kamenev and Zinoviev once again opposed the idea of an insurrection on the plea that the Bolsheviks were not strong enough and should await the Constituent Assembly. The resolution was resolutely supported by Dzerzhinsky, Kalinin Rahja, Sverdlov, Skrypnik and others who sharply criticised Kamenev's and Zinoviev's back-tracking. Lenin's resolution was adopted by 19 votes to 2, with four abstentions. A closed meeting of the Central Committee set up a Revolutionary Military Centre to direct the insurrection. It was to be a part of the Soviet Revolutionary Military Committee.    [p. 191]