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    Whereas:

    (1) with the wholesale destruction of productive forces and the unprecedented impoverishment of the people, the economic and financial crisis that Russia is experiencing, far from subsiding, is spreading and becoming more acute, causing frightful unemployment in the towns and famine in the countryside;

    (2) although the big capitalist and landlord class, frightened by the independent revolutionary activity of the people who are menacing its privileges and predatory interests, is turning sharply away from opposition towards a deal with the autocracy, with the object of suppressing the revolution, the demands for real political liberty and social and economic reforms are gaining ground and becoming stronger among new strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry;

    (3) the present reactionary government, striving in effect to preserve the old autocracy, trampling upon all the liberties it has proclaimed, granting only a consultative voice to the upper strata of the propertied classes, offering a gross travesty of popular representation, subjecting the whole country to a regime of military repression, savage brutalities and mass executions, and intensifying police and administrative tyranny to an unprecedented degree, is thereby causing unrest and discontent among broad sections of the bourgeoisie, arousing the resentment and indignation of the masses of the proletariat and peasantry, and paving the way for a new, wider and more acute political crisis;

    (4) the course of events at the end of 1905 -- mass strikes in the towns, unrest in the countryside and the armed uprising in December, produced by the desire to defend the liberties obtained by the people and taken away from them by the government, and the subsequent ruthless military suppression of the emancipation movement -- has revealed the futility of

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constitutional illusions, and has opened the eyes of the broad masses of the people to the harmfulness of such illusions in a period when the struggle for freedom has reached the intensity of open civil war;

    We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

    (1) that the democratic revolution in Russia, far from subsiding, is on the eve of a new upswing, and that the present period of comparative lull must be regarded, not as the defeat of the forces of revolution, but as a period of accumulation of revolutionary energy, assimilation of the political experience of preceding stages, enlistment of new strata of the people in the movement and, consequently, of preparation for a new and mightier revolutionary onslaught;

    (2) that the main form of the emancipation movement at the present time is not legal struggle on a quasi-constitutional basis, but the direct revolutionary movement of broad masses of the people, breaking the police and semi-feudal laws, making revolutionary law, and destroying by force the instruments for the oppression of the people;

    (3) that the interests of the proletariat, as the foremost class in modern society, demand that a relentless struggle be waged against the constitutional illusions which the liberal monarchist bourgeoisie (including the Constitutional-Democratic Party) is spreading in order to cover up its narrow class interests and which, in a period of civil war, produce the most corrupting eflect upon the political consciousness of the people.

    Whereas:

    (1) the whole history of the present democratic revolution in Russia shows us that, on the whole, the movement is steadily rising towards ever more determined, offensive forms of struggle against the autocracy, forms that are assuming an increasingly mass character and are embracing the whole country;

    (2) the political strike in October, which swept away the Bulygin Duma, compelled the autocratic government to proclaim the principles of political liberty and revealed the

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gigantic strength of the proletariat and its ability to take unanimous action on a country-wide scale, in spite of all the deficiencies of its class organisations;

    (3) with the further growth of the movement, the peaceful general strike proved inadequate, while partial recourse to it failed its aim and disorganised the forces of the proletariat;

    (4) the entire revolutionary movement led with elemental force to the armed uprising in December, when not only the proletariat but new forces of the urban poor and the peasantry took up arms to defend the liberties gained by the people from the encroachments of the reactionary government;

    (5) the December uprising gave rise to new barricade tactics, and proved generally that the open armed struggle of the people is possible even against modern troops;

    (6) owing to the introduction of a military and police dictatorship, despite constitutional promises, the masses of the people are becoming increasingly conscious of the necessity of fighting for real power, which the revolutionary people can capture only in open battle against the forces of the autocracy;

    (7) the autocracy is weakening and demoralising its military forces by employing them to suppress by force of arms the very people of whom they are a part, by not carrying out the now urgent military reforms that all honest elements in the army are demanding, by not taking steps to relieve the desperats conditions of the reservists, and by responding to the demands of the soldiers and sailors only by tightening police and barrack-room severities;

    We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

    (1) that at the present time armed uprising is not only the necessary means of fighting for freedom, but a stage actually reached by the movement, a step which, in view of the growth and intensification of a new political crisis, begins the transition from defensive to offensive forms of armed struggle;

    (2) that in the present stage of the movement, the general political strike must be regarded not so much as an independent means of struggle as an auxiliary means in relation to insurrection; that therefore the timing of such a strike, and the choice of its place and of the industries it is to involve should

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preferably depend upon the time and circumstances of the main form of struggle, namely, armed uprising;

    (3) that in its work of propaganda and agitation the Party must take special care to study the practical experience of the December uprising, examine it critically from the military point of view, and draw practical lessons from it for the future;

    (4) that still greater efforts must be made to form more fighting squads, improve their organisation, and supply them with weapons of every type; and, as experience suggests, it is necessary to form not only Party fighting squads, but also squads associated with the Party, and entirely non-Party squads;

    (5) that there should be increased work among the armed forces, bearing in mind that discontent alone in the forces is not enough to achieve success for the movement, that there is also a need for direct agreement with the organised revolutionary-democratic elements in the armed forces, for the purpose of launching determined offensive operations against the government;

    (6) that in view of the growing peasant movement, which may flare up into a regular insurrection in the very near future, it is desirable to work for combining actions by the workers and the peasants, in order to organise, as far as possible, joint and simultaneous fighting operations.

    Whereas:

    (1) scarcely anywhere in Russia since the December uprising has there been a complete cessation of hostilities, which the revolutionary people are now conducting in the form of sporadic guerrilla attacks upon the enemy;

    (2) these guerrilla operations, which are inevitable when two hostile armed forces face each other, and when repression by the temporarily triumphant military is rampant, serve to disorganise the enemy's forces and pave the way for future open and mass armed operations;

    (3) such operations are also necessary to enable our fighting squads to acquire fighting experience and military

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training, for in many places during the December uprising they proved to be unprepared for their new tasks;

    We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

    (1) that the Party must regard the fighting guerrilla operations of the squads affiliated to or associated with it as being, in principle, permissible and advisable in the present period;

    (2) that the character of these fighting guerrilla operations must be adjusted to the task of training leaders of the masses of workers at a time of insurrection, and of acquiring experience in conducting offensive and surprise military operations;

    (3) that the paramount immediate object of these operations is to destroy the government, police and military machinery, and to wage a relentless struggle against the active Black-Hundred organisations which are using violence against the population and intimidating it;

    (4) that fighting operations are also permissible for the purpose of seizing funds belonging to the enemy, i.e., the autocratic government, to meet the needs of insurrection, particular care being taken that the interests of the people are infringed as little as possible;

    (5) that fighting guerrilla operations must be conducted under the control of the Party and, furthermore, in such a way as to prevent the forces of the proletariat from being frittered away and to ensure that the state of the working-class movement and the mood of the broad masses of the given locality are taken into account.

    Whereas:

    (1) in developing into armed struggle, the revolutionary movement against the autocratic government has so far taken the form of sporadic local insurrections;

    (2) in this open struggle, the elements of the local population that are capable of fighting resolutely against the old regime (almost exclusively the proletariat and the advanced

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sections of the petty bourgeoisie) have been compelled to set up organisations that in practice have been embryonic forms of a new revolutionary authority -- the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in St. Petersburg, Moscow and other cities, the Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies at Vladivostok, Krasnoyarsk and elsewhere, the railwaymens' committees in Siberia and in the South, the peasant committees in Saratov Gubernia, the town revolutionary committees in Novorossiisk and other towns, and lastly, the elected village bodies in the Caucasus and in the Baltic Provinces;

    (3) in keeping with the initial, rudimentary form of the insurrection, these bodies were just as sporadic, haphazard, irresolute in their activities, and lacked the support of an organised armed force of the revolution, and were therefore doomed to fall at the very first offensive operations of the counter-revolutionary armies;

    (4) only a provisional revolutionary government, as the organ of a victorious insurrection, can completely crush all resistance by reaction, ensure complete freedom for election agitation, convene on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot a constituent assembly capable of really establishing the sovereignty of the people and putting into effect the minimum social and economic demands of the proletariat;

    We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

    (1) that in order to complete the revolution, the urgent task now confronting the proletariat is, jointly with the revolutionary democrats, to help to unite the insurrection, and to set up an organ that will unite it, in the shape of a provisional revolutionary government;

    (2) that one of the conditions for the successful fulfilment of the functions of the revolutionary government is the establishment, in all the towns and village communities that have joined the insurrection, of organs of revolutionary local self-government, elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot;

    (3) that the participation of delegates of our Party in the provisional revolutionary government jointly with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats is permissible depending on the alignment of forces, and must formally be made con-

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ditional on control of these delegates by the Party and, in substance, on their upholding the independent interests of the working class and staunchly maintaining the independence of the Social-Democratic Party, which strives for the complete socialist revolution and is therefore relentlessly hostile to all bourgeois parties;

    (4) that, irrespective of whether it will be possible for Social-Democrats to participate in the provisional revolutionary government or not, propaganda must be carried on among the broadest possible sections of the proletariat to explain that the armed proletariat, guided by the Social-Democratic Party, should bring constant pressure to bear upon the provisional government, with a view to protecting, consolidating and enlarging the gains of the revolution.

    Whereas:

    (1) Soviets of Workers' Deputies spring up spontaneously in the course of mass political strikes as non-party organisations of the broad masses of the workers;

    (2) in the course of the struggle, these Soviets inevitably undergo a change both as regards their composition, by absorbing the more revolutionary elements of the petty bourgeoisie, and as regards the nature of their activities, by growing from purely strike organisations into organs of the general revolutionary struggle;

    (3) insofar as these Soviets are rudiments of revolutionary authority, their strength and importance depend entirely on the strength and success of the insurrection;

    We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

    (1) that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party should participate in non-party Soviets of Workers' Deputies, unfailingly form the strongest possible groups of Party members in each Soviet, and direct the activities of these groups strictly in accordance with the general activities of the Party;

    (2) that the formation of such organisations for the purpose of increasing Social-Democratic influence on the pro-

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letariat, and the influence of the proletariat on the course and outcome of the democratic revolution, may, in certain conditions, be left to the local organisations of our Party;

    (3) that the broadest possible sections of the working class, and also of representatives of the revolutionary democrats, particularly peasants, soldiers and sailors, should be induced to take part in the non-party Soviets of Workers' Deputies;

    (4) that as the activities and sphere of influence of Soviets of Workers' Deputies expand, it must be pointed out that these institutions are bound to collapse unless they are backed by a revolutionary army and unless the government authorities are overthrown (i.e., unless the Soviets are transformed into provisional revolutionary governments); and that therefore one of the main tasks of these institutions in every revolutionary situation must be to arm the people and to strengthen the military organisations of the proletariat.

    Whereas:

    (1) the Social-Democratic Party has always recognised the necessity of supporting every opposition and revolutionary movement against the existing social and political system in Russia;

    (2) at the present time, when the revolution is bringing various classes into open action, thus stimulating the formation of political parties, it is the urgent duty of the Social-Democratic Party to ascertain the class character of these parties, to appraise the present relations between the classes, and to determine its own attitude to the various parties accordingly;

    (3) the main task of the working class at the present stage of the democratic revolution is to carry it to its completion and therefore, in determining its attitude towards the other parties, the Social-Democratic Party must particularly take into account the extent to which each party is capable of actively promoting this object;

    (4) from this point of view, all existing non-Social-Democratic parties in Russia (bar the reactionary parties) may be

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divided into two main groups: liberal-monarchist parties and revolutionary-democratic parties;

    Whereas:

    (1) in the course of the revolution the proletariat of all the nationalities in Russia is becoming more and more united by the common struggle;

    (2) this common struggle is bringing the various national Social-Democratic parties in Russia closer together;

    (3) in many towns amalgamated committees of all the national Social-Democratic organisations of the particular locality are being formed, in place of the former federal committees;

    (4) most of the national Social-Democratic parties no longer insist on the principle of federation, which was rightly rejected by the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party;

    We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

    (1) that the most energetic measures must be taken to achieve the speedy amalgamation of all the national Social-Democratic parties in Russia into a united Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party;

    (2) that the basis of this amalgamation must be the complete merging of all the Social-Democratic organisations in each locality;

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    (3) that the Party must really ensure the satisfaction of all the Party interests and requirements of the Social-Democratic proletariat of each nationality, giving due consideration also to the specific features of its culture and way of life; and that this may be ensured by holding special conferences of Social-Democrats of the particular nationality, giving representation to the national minorities on the local, regional and central bodies of the Party, forming special groups of authors, publishers, agitators, etc.

    Note. The representation of a national minority on the Central Committee of the Party could, for example, be arranged in the following manner: the general Party congress may elect to the Central Committee a definite number of members from among candidates nominated by the regional congresses in those parts of Russia where at present separate Social-Democratic organisations exist.

    Whereas:

    (1) the Social-Democratic Party has always regarded the economic struggle as a component of the proletarian class struggle;

    (2) the experience of all capitalist countries shows that the most advisable form of organisation of the working class for the economic struggle is that of broad trade unions;

    (3) at the present time a general striving is observed among the masses of the workers in Russia to associate in trade unions;

    (4) the economic struggle can bring about a lasting improvement in the conditions of the masses of the workers, and a strengthening of their truly class organisation, only if this struggle is properly combined with the political struggle of the proletariat;

    We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

    (1) that all Party organisations must promote the formation of non-party trade unions, and induce all Party members to join the trade unions in their respective trades;

    (2) that the Party must exert every effort to educate the workers who belong to trade unions in the spirit of a broad

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understanding of the class struggle and the socialist aims of the proletariat; by its activities to win a virtually leading position in these unions; and lastly to ensure that these unions, under certain conditions, come into direct association with the Party -- however, without at all expelling non-party members from their ranks.

    Whereas:

    (1) the State Duma is a gross travesty of popular representation, since:

    (a) the suffrage is not univrersal, not equal, and not direct, the bulk of the workers and peasants are practically debarred from participation in the State Duma, and the ratio of electors from the various groups of the population has been made to fit in with the views of the police;

    (b) as regards its powers and its position in relation to the Council of State, the Duma is an impotent appendage of the autocratic bureaucracy;

    (c) the conditions under which the elections are proceeding make it utterly impossible for the people really to express their will, owing to the absence of freedom to carry on agitation, to military repressions, mass executions, arrests, and police and administrative tyranny;

    (d) the government's sole purpose in convening such a State Duma is to deceive the people, strengthen the autocracy, make further financial swindles easier for it, and strike a bargain with the reactionary elements of the exploiting classes, whose predominance in the State Duma is assured;

    (2) participation in elections to the State Duma, while in no way helping to develop the class-consciousness of the proletariat or to strengthen and enlarge its class organisation and fighting preparedness, is more likely to disorganise and corrupt the proletariat, since:

    (a) if the Social-Democratic Party participated in the elections, it would inevitably foster among the people constitutional illusions, belief that the elections can to some estent truly espress the will of the people, and the notion that the Party is taking the path of pseudo-constitutionalism;

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    (b) in view of their small number, the shortness of their period of office and their special functions, the groups of delegates elected by the workers, and of electors, can in no way help in building a really revolutionary organisation of the proletariat;

    (c) participation in the elections focuses the attention of the proletariat on the farce being played by the government rather than on the revolutionary movement that is going on outside the Duma, and concentrates attention on agitation among small groups of electors rather than on extensive agitation among the masses;

    (d) our participation in the elections cannot facilitate the Social-Democratic education of the more ignorant sections of the masses who want to take part in the Duma elections, exclusively in the legal way, a method which the R.S.D.L.P. cannot at present adopt;

    (e) the withdrawal of a section of the electors from the gubernia election meetings could neither frustrate the convocation of the Duma nor give rise to a broad popular movement;

    (3) participation in the elections in the present political situation will compel the Social-Democrats either to step aside, without any benefit to the movement, or to stoop to the position of silent abettors of the Constitutional-Democrats;

    We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

    (1) that the R.S.D.L.P. must emphatically refuse to take part in the State Duma;

    (2) that the R.S.D.L.P. must emphatically refuse to participate in the State Duma elections at any stage;

    (3) that the R.S.D.L.P. must make most vigorous use of all meetings connected with the elections to expound Social-Democratic views in general, and ruthlessly to criticise the State Duma in particular, and especially to call for a struggle for the revolutionary convocation of a constituent assembly of the whole people;

    (4) that the R.S.D.L.P. must also use the agitation about the Duma to acquaint the broadest possible masses of the people with all the Party's views on tactics in the present revolutionary situation, and on the tasks arising from it.

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    Whereas:

    (1) the principle of democratic centralism in the Party is now universally recognised;

    (2) although made difficult, it can nevertheless be put into effect within certain limits in existing political conditions;

    (3) mixing the secret with the legal apparatus of the Party organisation has proved most fatal for the Party, and plays into the hands of government provocation;

    We are of the opinion, and propose that the Congress should agree:

    (1) that the elective principle in the Party organisations should be applied from top to bottom;

    (2) that departures from this principle, for example: two-stage elections or co-optation to elected bodies, etc., may be permitted only when police obstacles are insurmountable, and in exceptional cases especially provided for;

    (3) that it is imperative to preserve and strengthen the secret nucleus of the Party organisation;

    (4) that for public activities of all kinds (in the press, at meetings, in the unions, particularly trade unions, etc.) special departments of the Party organisations should be formed, which could not in any way jeopardise the secret nuclei;

    (5) that there must be one central body for the Party, i.e., the general congress of the Party must elect a single Central Committee, which shall appoint the editorial board of the Party's Central Organ, etc.

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