ON TROTSKYISM

Problems of theory and history

 
[ Part 3 : Appendicies and Bibliography ]


Kostas Mavrakis

Translated by John McGreal

[Manuscript typed by Jennifer R. Poole]

 








© Librairie François Maspero 1973
Translation © Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd 1976

 

APPENDICES   I  THE USSR, PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE AND VIETNAM   II  THE JCR IN MAY-JUNE 1968  III  CH'EN TU-HSIU'S IDEOLOGICAL ITINERARY NOTES   [Appendicies only] BIBLIOGRAPHY

195 207 211 213 241

 
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Appendix I

THE USSR, PEACEFUL
CO-EXISTENCE AND VIETNAM

 








This article appeared at a time when the campaign for the formation of 'Comités Vietnam de Base' was launched. Their role in the preparations for May-June in France is well-known. Let us add simply that they stood out not only by a more consistent support for the Vietnamese people (it was they who popularised the slogan 'Victory to the NLF!') but also by their ability to carry out sustained work of daily explanation among ordinary people in the localities. The Trotskyists, on the other hand, were content to participate in the episodic initiatives of the 'Comité Vietnam Nationale' which appealed only to intellectuals. They could not, in any case, support the Vietnamese on the basis of the latter's slogans with respect to a 'Just war' ('Just' is a moral notion without any class content for the Trotskyists'); 'the invincibility of People's War', which they are against, claiming that the Vietnamese should launch the slogan of socialist revolution and abandon the alliance with the national petty and middle bourgeoisie.
    At the time, the theme of the international front against imperialism was the anti-Chinese war-horse of the revisionists, the Trotskyists and the 'third roaders' in general. Therefore it was important to show that the Soviets did not demand this front in order to prepare a decisive riposte to American aggression, but so as to get the Chinese to 'suspend the polemics' and to agree to a policy aiming to conclude a compromise with the USA over the heads of the South Vietnamese. The Chinese refusal brought unshakable support to the Vietnamese, determined to carry their fight for the liberation of their country through to the end. The position which the Trotskyists adopted on this occasion illustrates their 'centrism' which, despite their verbal extremism, prevents them from tracing a clearer line of demarcation between themselves and revisionist betrayal and leads them in fact to practise various forms of tailism with regard to the so-called 'workers'' parties.

 
A RESOLUTE UNITED FRONT AGAINST AMERICAN IMPERIALISM(1)

The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government always wave the flag highest for the struggle against the imperialists

 
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led by the USA, give total support to the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed nations and defend world peace. (Speech by Nguyen Minh Phuong - Acting Head of the permanent mission of the NLF in Peking - on 19 December 1966, the twenty-second anniversary of the formation of the PLA and the sixth anniversary of the founding of the NLF.)

Although material aid to the Vietnamese people is important, it is the thought of Mao Tse-tung which is the invaluable treasure for us. (Speech by Tran Tu Binh - the Ambassador of the DRV to China - on 19 December 1966.)(2)

The Vietnamese comrades are in a good position to know the nature of American imperialism. The above statements forcefully emphasise the following two principles:

    1. The only way to defend world peace is resolute support for the struggle of the oppressed peoples against American imperialism, a warmonger by nature.
    2. The most important support is consistent political support based on Marxism-Leninism.

It follows that united action against the US aggressors is only possible with those who denounce it as the principal enemy and resolutely combat it. It is impossible with those who are trying to come to terms with it at the expense of the revolutionary peoples of the world and who are plotting a Vietnamese Munich
    For two years the leaders of the CPSU have called for united action to help Vietnam. Of course unity is a good thing but before uniting with someone it is necessary to know whether he is a friend or an enemy, if his aims are in agreement or contradiction with those which one wants to achieve. To this end we shall examine in turn:

    (a)  The contradictions of the contemporary world and the correct conception of the united front against American imperialism.
    (b)  The ideology propagated by the Soviet leaders and their policy towards the American aggression in Vietnam.

 
THE FOUR CONTRADICTIONS

The contradictions oppose:

    1. the socialist camp to the imperialist camp;
    2. the proletariat to the bourgeoisie;
    3. the oppressed nations to imperialism;
    4. the imperialist countries and monopoly-capitalist groups to each other.

These four contradictions are a 'constant throughout the period of the general crisis of capitalism, which has begun with the October Revolution and will go on until the world victory of socialism'. They constitute a connected system, each of them being present in all the others. Here are two examples:

    (a)  the contradiction between the two camps is revealed through the other three contradictions;
    (b)  the national liberation struggles are an integral part of the world socialist revolution. Their character and their development are affected by (i) the support of the socialist

 
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camp and the imperialists' fear of seeing this camp strengthened; (ii) the support of the proletariats of the advanced capitalist countries; (iii) the inter-imperialist contradictions which assist their struggles.

The connected character of this system of four fundamental contradictions explains how they can converge. At present they converge in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the countries dominated by imperialism, the 'weakest link' in its chain and the 'storm-centre' of the world. In other words, the third contradiction is the most explosive at present.

 
AN ANTI-AMERICAN UNITED FRONT

The peoples of these regions clash everywhere with American imperialism, its accomplices and puppets. It intervenes everywhere to repress the peoples' struggles as the international gendarme of 'Western civilisation'. At the same time it tries to impose its hegemony on the other imperialist countries, which does not happen without provoking opposition. Thus American imperialism is at one of the poles of each of the four fundamental contradictions. It is possible and necessary to isolate it by forming a broad united front. The latter implies:

    - the combination of all forces resolutely opposed to American imperialism;
    - the denunciation of the fraud represented by the 'peace negotiations' proposed by Johnson or his British or other errand boys as well as all the attempts to give him a 'way out' in Vietnam thanks to a compromise over the heads of the Vietnamese people.

 
THERE IS COMPROMISE AND COMPROMISE

Let there be no mistake, this does not mean that there are no situations in which a compromise with the enemy might not be necessary; but these are always tactical compromises; truces which only serve to prepare one's forces better for the next attack. Such a compromise is akin to a strategic retreat. The aim of the latter, says Mao, 'is to preserve the strength of the army and to prepare for the counter-offensive'. Unprincipled compromises are those which prepare not for the counter-offensive but for a definitive settlement with the enemy; that is to say, surrender. Is it not surrender for revolutionaries to renounce revolution? It is, and more, for there is no third road. One is revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. He who wants to make his peace with imperialism is on the threshold of passing lock, stock and barrel over to its side.

 
WHAT CO-EXISTENCE PROMISES . . .

The degeneration of the leaders of the CPSU illustrates this process. Since the 20th Congress (February 1956) Khrushchev, his successors and his supporters throughout the world have explained that the goal of Soviet policy was to banish from social life now

 
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and for ever all wars and not only atomic war. The establishment of a perpetual peace is necessary since 'the spark of a local war can set the world alight' and destroy mankind. It is possible before the world triumph of socialism and the disappearance of class antagonlsm, on the other hand, mainly because of the presence of reasonable statesmen at the head of the principal imperialist countries (President Eisenhower 'is as anxious as we are to ensure peace,' said Khrushchev). As civil wars are also wars, this noble ideal of peace will be realised all the more easily if communists avoid the resort to violence. The latter is no longer necessary, as it is now possible for them 'to win a solid parliamentary majority' and to use it to carry out the transition to socialism peacefully The historical mission of the proletariat is to defend peace' and peaceful co-existence is the higher form of the class struggle'.
    This idea of peaceful co-existence has supposedly already proved its effectiveness. For example, the Soviet theoretician G. Strarushenko wrote (in 'La Vie internationale', October 1963):

At present the policy of peaceful co-existence . . . paralyses the counter-revolutionary aggression of imperialism on the whole earth (sic), favouring the rise of the national revolutionary movement of national liberation.

 
. . . WHAT IT ACHIEVES

Today, with the examples of Vietnam, Laos, the Congo, Gabon and San Domingo, this idyllic image of international relations seems hardly convincing. Besides, these are not contingent defeats of the policy of 'peaceful co-existence', but its direct result. The Soviet leaders could make William the Silent's motto their own: 'It is not necessary to hope to undertake, nor to succeed to persevere.' The fact that the 'Camp David spirit' was followed by the U-2 incident, that the Vienna meeting did not prevent the blockade of Cuba, that the Treaty of Moscow led to the aggression in North Vietnam - none of these things has dissipated their illusions about the possibility of an understanding with the imperialists. Are they, besides labouring under illusions? Do they also share those which their propaganda diffuses every day among the masses? (Particularly the possibility of imposing a general and complete disarmament on the imperialists?)
    Or rather, is this merely a smokescreen behind which they are pursuing their grand design, a rapprochement with the USA at the expense of the peoples of the entire world?
    Given the principles according to which socialist countries do not export revolution, peaceful co-existence as Marxist-Leninists understand it (the maintenance of the system of the four fundamental contradictions, non-crossing of frontiers by armies) can be imposed by the balance of forces. On the other hand, the Khrushchevite peaceful co-existence' (end to the Cold War, co-operation and friendship with the imperialists) implies the adversary's agreement. Seeing Khrushchev begging for their friendship, the imperialists put their conditions to him. President Johnson formulated them in his message on 21 January 1964 at the Geneva Conference:(3)

We will be prepared to discuss means of prohibiting the threat or

 
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use of force, directly or indirectly - whether by aggression, subversion, or the clandestine supply of arms - to change boundaries or demarcation lines; to interfere with access to territory; or to extend control or administration over territory by displacing established authorities.

In this way, Johnson asked the Soviet government to co-operate with him to proscribe the threat to the established powers. As 'Le Monde' commented: 'This is really the basic problem.'

 
THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD

The reactionaries have always feared 'subversion' and 'indirect aggression' much more than a war of conquest unleashed by the USSR. If they trumpeted that it was an aggressive power aspiring to conquer the world, they were translating into their own language the fact that the USSR supported the peoples' revolutionary struggles. Today we must believe that they are no longer worried about this. When, after its return from Moscow in 1964, the SFIO delegation declared that it recognised the USSR's desire for peace, one could justifiably wonder who converted who. Reading ex-Chancellor Adenauer's enthusiastic statements after the Tashkent agreement acclaiming the USSR as a champion of peace makes one sure about this. Can the word 'peace' mean the same coming from revolutionaries and from the most reactionary of German reactionaries? Can we join in united action with those who have many times proclaimed their willingness to agree and unite with the American imperialists to share the world? On 10 September 1961 Khrushchev stated that 'We are the strongest countries in the world and if we unite for peace there can be no war. Then if any madman wanted wars, we would but have to shake our fingers to warn him off.'(4) And here is what Gromyko declared on 13 December 1962 (the day after the crisis in the Caribbean): 'If there is agreement between the government heads of the Soviet Union and the USA, "there will be a solution of international problems on which mankind's destinies depend".'(5)
    These were fond illusions, for the peoples of the world have not accepted and will never accept that two statesmen decide their fate. The spirited development of the struggle of the Vietnamese people has somewhat upset Khrushchev's plans.

 
THE IMPERIALISTS PREPARE FOR ESCALATION

Towards the end of 1963, the Americans began to envisage an extension of the war to North Vietnam in an attempt, by a sort of 'flight forward', to bring to an end a conflict in which they felt they were getting inescapably bogged down in. By moving from special war to classic war, they hoped that their superiority in weapons would give them victory. Thanks to an inspired leak from the Pentagon, the 'New York Times' announced on 9 June 1964 that the American general staff had advised the government to bomb targets in the North. The aim of this announcement and the whole campaign of official and unofficial statements in which it took place was to sound out the intentions of the USSR while blackmailing Hanoi.

 
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    In the face of such a definite threat, the Soviet Union had one infallible means to dissuade the Americans from firing their shot: a solemn declaration that it would respond to any aggression against the DRV, a member of the socialist camp, exactly as if it were a question of the USSR itself, a demonstration that this warning was serious by strengthening the Vietnamese anti-aircraft defences with the most modern apparatus and also by sending units of the Soviet fleet armed with missiles to the Gulf of Tonkin. The USSR not only carefully abstained from these measures which alone could have preserved peace, but let it be understood, moreover, that it was unconcerned in what was happening in South-east Asia by making it known that it was considering resigning from its offices as co-President of the Geneva Conference.
    Marshall Malinowski had already stated on 24 January 1962 that the military power of the Soviet Union protected 'the socialist countries which are friendly to us'. These and other similar statements (cf. 'Pravda' 7 January 1963) were interpreted by the Pentagon experts in a restrictive sense. To dot the i's Valerian Zorin published an article in 'Izvestia' on 30 January 1964 entitled 'The problems of disarmament and the manoeuvres of Peking' in which he claimed that if China seeks to become a nuclear power it is because it 'has aims and pursues special interests which the socialist camp cannot support by military force'. This veiled warning took certain American plans into account. The journal 'The Minority of One' (the editorial committee of which includes four Nobel Prize Winners) published an enquiry in which we read:

The partly public debate between the government and the army of the United States as to whether an armed intervention in North Vietnam would weaken enemy pressure on the forces engaged in the South only serves to hide a far more secret discussion on the advisability of plunging into a much more total war against the People's Republic of China.

Thus in the conflict that was approaching the USSR denounced China in advance as responsible and declared that it would stand aside. Replying on 8 July to a note from Hanoi on 25 June, the Soviet government was silent about the aid that it could provide in the event of American aggression against North Vietnam. The leaders in Washington interpreted all these facts to mean that they had a green light for such a project. The pattern of events was to bear them out.

 
DON'T GO TOO FAR!

After an incident totally fabricated by the Americans, the latter bombed five towns in North Vietnam on 4 August 1964. How did the USSR react? Very simply . . . it did not react. 'Izvestia' did publish an article entitled 'Don't go too far!' One way of saying that the Americans had not gone too far. A logical position, moreover, since the journal implicitly admitted that the pretext put forward by the USA was true, objecting only that one cannot talk about legitimate defence 'thousands of kilometres away from American territory'. In contrast, the correspondent of the New China News Agency made a point of showing all the improbabilities,

 
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contradictions and absurdities contained in the American account which, anyway, the serious organs of the Western press discussed with as much scepticism. The Tass Agency merely declared 'Official Soviet circles resolutely condemn the aggressive actions of the USA in the Gulf of Tonking which are leading to a dangerous worsening of an already delicate situation.' In short, the USSR only blamed the USA for 'ill-considered or provocative acts and steps' ('L'Humanité', August 1964) which increased 'tension'. The reactionary press was not taken in: in an article entitled 'Russians and Americans, the same aim' on 11 August, for example, 'France-Soir' declared:

According to the Americans, China now knows that it cannot rely on Soviet nuclear protection if it embarks on a warlike adventure. For the moment, the Soviets and the Americans therefore seem to have the same aim: the re-establishment of peace in South-east Asia. They have reached an understanding at the expense of Peking. It even seems that President Johnson may have been in contact with Khrushchev on this question during the crisis.

 
THE MOSCOW TREATY

In fact, did Khrushchev use the hot-line when he still had the time (Johnson made a speech announcing the attacks several hours before the bombers took off), or did he think that the bombing of a socialist country was not an act liable to endanger world peace. . . ? If the two associates did talk it is above all probable, furthermore, that they congratulated each other on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Moscow Treaty, 'a great step forward towards detente and complete general disarmament', which was at that moment being celebrated with great pomp in the USSR.

 
THE IMPERIALISTS GROW BOLD

Seeing that, in accordance with their expectations and contrary to its assurances, the USSR was not reacting, the American imperialists grew bold. The only assurance given by the Soviet leaders, anyway, was that they 'would not remain indifferent'. President Johnson reckoned that the indifference or non-indifference of Moscow would make no difference to him. As early as September, he had taken the decision to bomb North Vietnam systematically. Perhaps because they were not conversant with this decision, the Soviet and French revisionists greeted his success in the Presidential elections as a victory for peace.
    When the bombings in the North became daily in March 1965, 'all the Soviet soldiers and politicians joined in unison to raise the spectre of a world war rather than emphasizing the Soviet ability to exert military pressure locally', it was pointed out ironically by a Pentagon expert, T. W. Wolfe, in a statement before a sub-committee of the House of Representatives (11 March 1965).

 
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THE SOVIET DOCTRINE: TOTAL SURRENDER OR TOTAL DESTRUCTION

According to the doctrine taught in manuals of military strategy in the USSR, a local conflict in which the two greatest world powers got involved 'would inevitably degenerate into a thermo-nuclear war' (cf. 'Voiennaia Stratgia', ed. Marshall Sokolovski, p. 299 of the American translation). One can now understand why the USSR did not reply to the bombing of North Vietnamese towns. One might simply ask if a line does exist which would call forth a Soviet reaction if crossed by the American imperialist aggressors. Until 1964, it was thought that this line surrounded the entire socialist camp. Since then, one can reasonably surmise that it only includes the USSR. A question then arises: if the Americans bombed Odessa tomorrow, why should the whole of humanity perish to avenge the inhabitants of Odessa? Would their lives be worth more than those of the inhabitants of Dong Hoi?
    There are two answers to this question:

    1. The lives of the inhabitants of Odessa are in actual fact more valuable because they are Russian and not Vietnamese. As a Soviet journalist said, 'the man in the street has no need of subtle doctrines; he thinks, as long as the bombs are not falling on my head - that's OK!' ('France nouvelle', 25 September 1963). The Soviet leaders have long since rid themselves of 'the subtle doctrine' of proletarian internationalism and will never take the slightest risk to defend even a socialist country against imperialism.
    2. It is not true that a local conflict between the USSR and the USA would necessarily degenerate into a thermo-nuclear war. This thesis is only put forward to justify the USSR's passivity, the real motive of which is its desire to come to terms and to co-operate with the USA.

 
BETRAYAL BEHIND A FACADE OF SUPPORT

Resistance to imperialism is the way to the defence of peace. The real problem is to know if one wants to resist it and if one stands ready to resist it.
    The Soviet leaders have been caught off their guard by every aggression of the USA and each ascent on the ladder of escalation. They were not prepared to face up to it either on the material or on the ideological level. How could they be, considering that for more than ten years the facts have constantly contradicted their analyses? Besides, the latter only have an apologetic function for them. Their problem is: how to co-operate with the imperialists while retaining their influence over at least a part of the international communist movement? This influence increases their 'bargaining power' with their American 'partners'. It is necessary to them, moreover, in order to help the Americans. They have thought up two enormous deceptions to fool the peoples:

    - the so-called obstacles which China put in the way of Soviet aid to Vietnam crossing its territory;
    - the unity of action to help Vietnam.

 
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'ANY LIE WILL BE BELIEVED IF IT IS BIG ENOUGH' (GOEBBELS)

Let us look into the first claim. Since March 1965, senior Soviet officials have leaked to Western correspondents in Moscow the news that China was opposing the transit of arms hurried through by the USSR while, in fact, China transmits all the equipment she receives with urgency and absolute priority, and for nothing. The revisionist press reproduced the despatches of the Western agencies, date-line Moscow, which, however, were contradicted by joint Soviet-Vietnamese statements according to which the aid programme to Vietnam was going ahead as planned. In January 1966 the Chinese government sent the Soviet government a note asking it to deny 'the false rumours of the so-called sabotage by China of the aid to North Vietnam'. Moscow refused to accept this note in order not to have to reply one way or the other. In March 1966, the leaders of the CPSU sent a letter to the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe which took up the same accusations. This letter was reprinted in 'Die Welt' and 'Le Monde' and has never been denied. Finally, in a speech given on 20 April 1966, in Budapest, Marshal Malinowski finally had the courage (or the cynicism) to take responsibility for these slanders. He got the reply he deserved. On 4 May, a Chinese spokesman described him as a 'liar', backing this up with the facts. Without using such virulent expressions, Pham Van Dong, the Prime Minister of Vietnam, thanked the Chinese on 25 April for its 'effective assistance as well as its devoted help in delivering aid sent by the Soviet Union and other fraternal European countries'. Later, the Vietnamese comrades repeatedly rejected the slanderous allegations put into circulation by the Soviet renegades. Thus, on 19 June 1966, the Vietnamese Information Agency communicated that:

A certain number of Western Agencies have recently propagated the rumour according to which the military material provided as aid by the Soviet Union is at present meeting with difficulties hindering its passage across China . . . the said information is only a totally fabricated fable contrived with evil provocative intent (see the complete text as well as General Giap's statement in 'Garde Rouge' no. 2).

Nevertheless, the revisionists continue imperturbably to repeat the same lines in accordance with the precept, 'If you throw enough mud some of it will always stick.'

 
A CONFESSION

What we must remember about this affair is not the disgraceful methods resorted to by the degenerate clique at the head of the CPSU, but the implicit confession which they contain. The revisionists seem to say that it is China's fault if the Vietnamese do not receive sufficient aid. The fact is that Vietnam receives aid well below the possibilities of the USSR both in quantity and quality. While the imperialists do the maximum to win the war, the USSR does the minimum necessary to hide its collusion with them. Washington is even grateful to it for this 'aid' and proclaims continually that the Vietnam war should not prevent closer Soviet-American co-operation.

 
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OUT-DATED ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE

Let us consider the anti-aircraft defences. Since 1962, the Soviets have asserted that they possess anti-missile missiles. Now it is a thousand times more difficult to hit a missile in flight than a plane. Today the USSR is in the process of installing these missiles around its big cities. These devices are so costly that the USA recoiled at the outlay and gave up the idea of installing them. The Soviet anti-missile missiles are therefore sufficiently effective to justify such sacrifices. Is it not astonishing to note that the whole of the Vietnamese anti-aircraft defences have only rarely inflicted losses exceeding 1-5 per cent on the American pirates? It is because the missiles provided by the USSR date from 1958 and are totally out of date. According to French military experts, the ordinary anti-aircraft missiles at France's disposal are capable of bringing down 80 per cent of the attacker's planes. We can therefore reasonably suppose that the Soviet missiles are capable of bringing down at least 60 per cent of them, even if they are used by inadequately trained Vietnamese personnel. This percentage would have been even higher if the USSR had trained the gun crews before the bombing. In this case, it is even quite certain that the latter would not have begun in the first place.

 
THE COLD WAR: A MISUNDERSTANDING

Not to prepare to resist aggression is to encourage it. But how could the Soviet leaders have prevented the imperialists from wresting the initiative from them when they have always considered the cold war as a misunderstanding which a tête-à-tête between statesmen would be enough to clear up. (Look at the spirit of Camp David which has long haunted revisionist propaganda.) When Mao says, 'At whatever moment the civil war breaks out we must be ready. Even if it should arrive very soon, say tomorrow morning, we must also be ready', he seems to be stating a commonplace like Demosthenes's statement that 'those who know how to make war forestall events instead of following them'. Of course this idea is not difficult to understand; the enemy must still be considered an enemy. Secure from any attack on their own territory thanks to their modern arms, the Soviet leaders do not think that their national interests in other respects are always opposed to those of the USA. They avoid giving Vietnam means capable of doing too much damage to the Americans. This would compromise their good relations with them. Even quantitative level Soviet aid is ridiculously insufficient. 'During the year 1965 China transported to Vietnam some 43,000 tons of Soviet equipment', a spokesman of the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs declared on 4 May 1966. Jean Baby, who quotes this statement, points out: 'By way of comparison, the Americans have sent 800,000 tons of military equipment every month, not including the bombs carried by the planes of the Seventh Fleet.' The Chinese spokesman added the following specification: 'In the first quarter of 1966 the USSR asked China for 1,730 trucks to transport military equipment. China gave its agreement and got the trucks ready; yet the deliveries carried out represented only 536 trucks' (quoted by Jean Baby, ibid.).

 
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    The Soviet leaders help the USA to transfer their forces from Europe to Asia by making concession after concession to them on the questions of Germany and West Berlin. Did they not forego signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR? They themselves have trans- ferred troops from Central Europe to the Far East. Together with the imperialists they help to encircle China, the red base of the revolutionary peoples.

 
CO-ORDINATION OR SUSPENSION OF THE POLEMICS

The revisionists now criticise China for not co-operating with the other socialist countries to co-ordinate aid to Vietnam. What does this accusation mean? According to the 'People's Daily' on 14 June 1965, 'China provided as much aid to the Vietnamese people as she could.' The Soviet leaders have not dared to make such a statement. According to the estimates of American experts, China provides aid at least equal in value to that of the USSR (some 500 million dollars) although her industrial production is four times lower. We have seen that China does not prevent the aid from other socialist countries reaching its destination. What then, would be the use of the 'co-ordination' which the Soviet Union makes such a fuss about since it would not increase the Chinese aid or theirs? Its only function would be to secure an implicit certificate of good conduct from China for the Soviet policy in Vietnam. This would be no more or less than the suspension of the polemics which the renegades in the Kremlin have been desperately calling for since 1963; that is, since they themselves initiated the public polemic against the Marxist-Leninists. Now the consistent struggle against imperialism is inseparable from the struggle against revisionism and opportunism. This is a position of principle already stated by Lenin .

 
A NEW TASHKENT

The revisionists do not support the struggle of the Vietnamese people politically. They proclaim their 'right to peace'. But they do not proclaim their right to a just peace based on the four points of the DRNV and the five points of the NLF. They unilaterally emphasise the sufferings of the Vietnamese people and the dangers of world war, but ignore the invincible character of the just war which it is conducting against the aggressor. They describe the NLF as 'representative' not as the sole, authentic representative of the Vietnamese people. The only condition which they have laid down for opening negotiations is a halt to the bombing and a pledge from the Americans to withdraw their troops, not the previous withdrawal of the latter demanded by the Vietnamese. They verbally denounce the fraud of the Americans' peace proposals (while practising secret diplomacy with them on a wide scale) but keep quiet about the acts of their faithful agents, the Tito-Ghandi clique. In this way they are preparing public opinion for a new 'Tashkent'; that is, an agreement based on the maintenance of the territorial 'status quo' and lines of demarcation (the 17th parallel!) which would hand South

 
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Vietnam over to imperialist domination as the Tashkent agreement handed the people of Kashmir over to the oppression of Indian chauvinism. They do not even hide their intentions. Did they not publish in March 1966 in 'Temps nouveaux', no. 6, an article declaring that 'two roads present themselves to the world, that of Tashkent or that of Vietnam'?

 
STRUGGLE AGAINST THE AGENTS OF IMPERIALISM

If the USSR provides a very inadequate and very limited aid to Vietnam (old stocks of out-dated arms), they do so in order to make sufficient political capital to be able when the moment arrives to swing the balance in favour of a solution which would offer 'a way out for the USA', according to Kosygin's expression. But the imperialists are not seeking a way out, they want victory. The way out which the revisionists would like to offer them corresponds to their fundamental objective: the maintenance of their domination over South Vietnam. How could there be a united front on this basis? In addition, to consent to a suspension of the polemic would be to disarm the peoples ideologically and hand them over to the penetration of bourgeois ideology and its accomplice, revisionism.
    As the Vietnamese journal, 'Tam Viet Hoa', said on 13 July 1966:

The only true revolutionaries are those who resolutely combat American imperialism, while the modern revisionists have successfully arrived at a compromise with American imperialism and are renegades who put spokes in the wheels of the revolution.

In conclusion, there is no place for the revisionists in a united front against American imperialism for the excellent reason that they are its agents within the workers' movement!
    As Lenin said:(6) 'The fight against imperialism is a sham and humbug unless it is inseparably bound up with the fight against opportunism.'

 
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Appendix II

THE JCR IN MAY-JUNE 1968 (1)

 









What are the reasons for the deep affinities which linked a faction of the Trotskyists and the PSU for quite a time? These affinities led to Charléty.(2) As it does not seem that there has been the least self-criticism on this point, as on many others, we are entitled to ponder and ask some questions.
    Let us recall the essential facts: in the first week of May the ex-JCR constituted the secular arm of the UNEF: in the following weeks it concentrated in the Facultes and the new-born co-ordinations; in the decisive week of 24/31 May, it turned up with the PSU at the demonstrations on the 24th and then at Charléty Stadium. Finally, from then on, given 'the Gaullist counter-offensive', it decided that the tide was turning and that its task was to organise the vanguard, and especially as the agitation among the masses was persistent, that it was necessary to guard this newly-born vanguard from the temptations of adventurism and diehard attitudes. The supporters of the 'proletarian resistance' thus found they were labelled 'diehards'.
    It was the time when the great ghosts from the past were raised: it was recalled that it had taken years for the workers' movement to recover from its weakness after 'the Commune massacre'. Where did these ideas come from? Less from books or memories than from the revisionist CP. Subsequent events were to demonstrate it fully: the theme of the Commune as the funeral march of the working class is Waldeck Rochet's favourite theme.
    As is clear from these facts, one question is unavoidable: what was the reason for this political proximity of the ex-JCR and the PSU?

 
VANGUARDIST THOUGHT

Its most illuminating expression was that of 'rehearsal' (répétition). 1968 was the dress-rehearsal for the French socialist revolution. Well and good, but when we analyse the contents of this rehearsal the effect becomes frankly burlesque.
    Roughly speaking, if things did not work in 1968 it was because there was no vanguard; if there was no vanguard it was because at

 
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the decisive moment, the militants of the vanguard did not have the means to instil into the masses the vanguard line, which is that of 'workers' control', the line of 'the revolutionary transition'. This 'repeats' (répète) Trotsky's Transitional Program of 1938. This is not all; this programme is a repetition of Lenin's programme in 1917. And as everyone knows, 1917 was preceded by the rehearsal of 1905. The class struggle is a theatre where the same play is always performed.
    Such a vanguardist thought which would have upheld and repeated the first vanguard play acted on the stage, the Bolshevik revolution - that is what was missing in 1968.
    Let us read the ex-JCR's action during the revolutionary storm in the light of this theory. The ex-JCR is the vanguard since this thought belongs to it, but in 1968 this vanguard was not in a position to function as a vanguard.
    Two consequences: it reacted to the changes in the balance of forces as if it dominated it politically: it put itself in the place of a vanguard which it was not in fact but which it could have been The week of 24/31 May was decisive: there was a vacuum of power, why? Quite simply because if there had been a vanguard instead of the PCF-CGT, events would have gone quite differently: the power would have been there for the taking (and it would have been taken) . . .
    Likewise, since the PCF did not react to the counter-offensive of power on 31 May, since from this moment on the power was no longer there to take, the objective could only be to guard the vanguard (the one which . . . in the place of the PCF might have changed the face of history).
    We can see the practical result: this imaginary identification amounted to following the balance of forces decided by the PCF.
    One becomes the revolutionary shadow of the PCF, the projected shadow.
    Proletarian resistance is inadmissible in this category of ideas. In fact, its objective is precisely to upset the PCF-Gaullist game. Its objective is that the workers' strength which is repressed ideologically by revisionism should express itself with the help of the revolutionary students.
    This expression is the dawn of a proletarian party. A party which is born from the revolutionary struggle of the masses (revolutionary workers and students) against the enemies, the counter-revolution: the establishment and its revisionist accomplices.
    Two roads: either one calls oneself (in thought or in words) a vanguard and this leads to a 'paradoxical' political practice.
    Or one builds a vanguard, the leading core of the people's cause. And then one proceeds from reality. Which means, among other things that one proceeds from the fact that the masses still do not acknowledge us as the vanguard.
    To transform this reality is to show in deeds how one has made history advance.

 
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PETTY-BOURGEOIS REVOLUTIONISM

We have just seen how a vanguardist thought acquires in thought what must be created in matter. We have seen how such a thought implies tailism. In fact, this imaginary vanguard is forced to proceed from the reality produced by those who occupy the place which it wants (the leadership of the working class). In other words it (critically) tails along behind it.
    It remains to analyse the following fact: in this specific case, what is the real position adopted by this vanguard in words? If it is not in the van, where is it?
    The facts show that the ex-JCR was on the 'left' of the PSU. Why that position?
    In answer to this question it is not enough to say that it is no accident if they found each other good comrades since they were both 'leading' the same movement (the student movement); other political groups which had a mass influence in the revolutionary student movement (ex-22 March, ex-UJCML) did not have this putschist orientation.
    This coincidence must therefore have been facilitated not only by a common social reference group (the student movement) but by a convergent policy. This is what must be determined.
    Ideological convergence was perceptible well before May: the theses of Mandel, the thinker of the ex-JCR and the adaptor of Trotsky's Transitional Program to the conditions of our era, met and partially fused with the theses of petty-bourgeois socialism: the theses of 'revolutionary reformism'. The line of 'worker's control' became the line of 'anti-capitalist structural reforms'.
    The line of 'counter-power' has been amalgamated with that of 'dual power'. For the revolutionary reformists, counter-power is the line which consists of opposing one policy by another policy, and one power of decision-making by a counter-power; for example, opposing the power of the bosses by the power of the unions, a plan by a counter-plan, a model of civilisation by another model of civilisation.
    We can clearly see that this line proceeds from the forms of imperialist despotism (extension of despotism; new phenomena of distribution of power) and opposes to it a 'reformist' line of action: in fact, instead of determining a policy radically opposed to the present structure of despotism, a policy is proposed which, espousing the forms of despotism as they appear, is nothing but the renewal of the classical tactics of reformism: the imaginary 'nibbling' at power, the real refusal to destroy it because of the refusal to pose concretely the question of the gun which is the pillar of imperialist despotism.
    Apparently the Trotskyist case is very different, since here appeal is made to the theme of armed insurrection. But this is only an appearance.
    Let us consider Trotsky's Transitional Program, the fundamental reference. It seems to repeat in every aspect the Bolshevik Programme in 1917. But there is a snag: in 1917 the theme of workers' control was dependent on a concrete context from which it derived all its meaning. Divorced from this context it loses all its meaning. What was the context? The existence of Soviets, of a

 
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Red power devised by the masses. What was the essence of this power? It was a revolutionary power because, thanks to leading activity of the Bolsheviks, it combined two essential conditions: the support of the masses and the gun.
    It was a power because its base was a mass base and its pillar the embryo of the army, had already formed. In other words, in order to find ourselves in a 1917 type of situation once again, it would be necessary not only to have its line of 'workers' control' (for Lenin this was at most a secondary element of the line), but above all it would be necessary to have settled the question of the unified arming of the revolutionary classes (and not only of the proletariat): of the revolutionary classes, of the real majority of the people.(3)
    A flaw, as we see! In 1917, the Soviet was an unprecedented form of unified armament of the revolutionary classes. We know the secret of the matter: the inter-imperialist war had abolished the distance between town and country (fundamental problem of the Russian revolution), and the same war had given the gun to the peasant: he was the soldier.
    The principal question of the revolution is that of power; that is, before the dictatorship of the proletariat, that of revolutionary war: for good reason, it is not the question of workers' control (or co-management).
    When one claims to have rehearsed the big night by emerging from May 1968 with the line of workers' control, what else is one doing but to forget the gun even if elsewhere one chatters on about armed insurrection and the strike pickets who are its first detachments. Is the solution to the problem supposed to be invented in a month? Might one not just as well say that one does not regard it as a problem?
    In the context of May 1968 in which the violence was never politico-military but always politico-ideological (aiming less, in fact, at destroying the enemy than at arousing friendly forces), it is clear how this omission of the gun again became current.
    Trotsky's continuators and the supporters of the peaceful, extra-Parliamentary road (PSU) turned up on the same ground. The touching harmony at Charléty is understandable.
    One can see how [the] social base (anti-authoritarian ideological revolt of a petty-bourgeois character) and ideological base (amalgam of the Trotskyist line of transition and the revolutionary reformist line of transition) coincided to produce Charléty.
    All this was cemented together by the position vis-à-vis revisionism entitled 'Stalinist bureaucracy'. Just as the PSU line implies left unity and the tactics of the PSU are to put pressure on the left to 'renew' socialism; the tactics of the Trotskyists are to put pressure on the Stalinist bureaucracy, a workers' party but a blemished one (it has rejected the line of workers' control).
    That is how, at Charléty, the pressure of revolutionary reformism coincided with the pressure of the line of workers' control; a double pressure which had to crush revisionism. The facts: far from being crushed, revisionism emerged strengthened from Charléty.
    These are thus strange vanguards.

 
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Appendix III

CH'EN TU-HSIU'S IDEOLOGICAL
ITINERARY

 








As the Trotskyists have presented Ch'en Tu-hsiu as a much more profound and clever theoretician than Mao Tse-tung, we have deemed it useful to bring together here a few passages outlining his ideological itinerary drawn from Y. C. Wang's book, 'Chinese Intellectuals and the West 1872 - 1949'.(1) It emerges fairly clearly from these that the opportunism of his policy had other causes than Stalin's instructions.
    The son of a mandarin, Ch'en became Dean of Peking University. He played a big role in the May 4 Movement as editor of the journal 'New Youth'. In 1919, John Dewey, the American philosopher and pedagogue, made a lecture tour in China. It was under the inspiration of his teachings that Ch'en Tu-hsiu wrote an article entitled 'The basis for the realisation of democracy in China' for the December issue of 'New Youth', in which he suggested two programmes: local self-government and a new guild system. The two were possible, he believed, because (pp. 311-12):

under the traditional laisser-faire policy there had been many self-governing bodies in the Chinese body-politic . . . The guilds should be both the employers and the employees because, 'except in a few big factories, railroads and mines . . . the status of employers and employees differs little in China'. One of the general principles for the organisation of these self-governing bodies was that 'stress should be given to the practical needs of the group concerned rather than to the broad problems facing the nation[']!

In another article Ch'en urged the Chinese to study Christianity and to incorporate 'the loftiness and greatness of Jesus Christ into their blood' (p. 312).
    In May 1919, 'New Youth' published a special issue devoted to Marxism. 'The spirit that pervaded the issue was one of disappro- bation' (p. 316). 'But by May 1920, his stand had completely changed . . . (he) switched his belief from (bourgeois) democracy to Marxism-Leninism' (pp. 313-16).
    When it was founded in 1921, Ch'en Tu-hsiu was elected General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. He remained in this post until the extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee on 7 August 1927, at which his opportunist line was criticised. In 1928-9, he

 
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publicly attacked the party, which led to his expulsion in August 1929.(2) Then he joined the Trotskyists and in December published his 'Letter to all members of the Chinese Communist Party'.
    Arrested in 1932 by the Kuomintang authorities, he was condemned to thirteen years' imprisonment but was freed by 1937. He died in 1942.(3)
    In an article in 1940, Ch'en wrote: 'If Germany and Russia are to emerge victorious (from the war) humanity will face a dark age for at least half a century. Only if the capitalistic democracy can be preserved through a victory by England, France and America can there be a path to proletarian democracy.'
    To those who were shocked by his new views, Ch'en replied (pp. 318-19):

The difference between the so-called proletarian democracy and the capitalistic democracy is only one of scope. There does not exist a proletarian democracy with a different content. After the October Revolution efforts were made to destroy the substance of capitalistic democracy. It was replaced by a mere abstract term: proletarian democracy. The result is the Stalinist regime in Russia today, which is in turn imitated by Italy and Germany.

Y. C. Wang concludes his intellectual portrait of Ch'en Tu-hsiu in these terms (pp. 319-20):

Viewing Ch'en's life as a whole, it is difficult to detect any profound conviction on his part. He embraced Democracy and Science in 1919, when he was already forty years old. A bare few months later he forsook them for Communism. As leader of the party, he could not agree with the Comintern line, but yet lived by it for 'disciplinary reasons'. These, however, disappeared as soon as he lost the secretary-generalship, for contrary to the communist practice of democratic centralism . . . he started to criticise the policy of the Politburo. For this he was expelled, and the setback immediately turned his thought to the formation of a Trotskyist faction. After his release from prison in 1937, his attitude once again changed. Trotsky and Lenin now in turn yielded the place of honour to Western Democracy . . . What were the factors that underlay his volatility? One reason clearly was his intellectual shallowness. At no time did Ch'en really understand the causes that he either supported or opposed . . . A year was to elapse between his declaration for democracy and his attempt to elaborate on it. When it did appear, the elaboration was no more than an adaptation of Dewey's lectures with some shallow observations on China's guild system and village democracy. As a recent writer has shown,(4) even when Ch'en had become total]y committed to Marxism-Leninism, he was blissfully unaware of the myriad theoretical difficulties confronting Lenin and other Marxists.

 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

TROTSKY'S WRITINGS

'The Age of Permanent Revolution: A Trotsky Anthology', Isaac Deutscher (ed.), Dell, New York, 1964.

'The Class Nature of the Soviet State' and 'The Workers' State and the Question of Thermidor and Bonapartism', New Park Publications, London, August 1968.

'De la Révolution', Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1963. (Includes 'Cours Nouveau' (1923), 'La Révolution défigurée' (1927-9), 'La Révolution permanente' (1928-31), 'La Révolution trahie' (1936).) 'The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International (The Transitional Program)', Merit Pamphlet, 4th ed., New York, 1970.

'History of the Russian Revolution', 2 vols, Gollancz, London, 1932.

'In Defence of Marxism', Merit Publishers, New York, 1965.

'The New Course', Cresset Press, London, 1965.

'1905', Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1972.

'Nos tâches politiques', Editions Pierre Belfond, Paris, 1970.

'Our Political Tasks', Connolly Books, Belfast, 1969.

'The Permanent Revolution' and 'Results and Prospects', Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1965.

'Politique de Trotsky', texts selected and introduced by Jean Baechler, Armand Colin, Paris, 1968.

'Problems of the Chinese Revolution', Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1932.

Rapport de la délegation siberienne, 'Spartacus' 1970.

'The Revolution Betrayed', Faber & Faber, London, 1937.

'The Soviet Union and the Fourth International', G. A. Aldred, 145 Queen St., Glasgow, 1934.

'Stalin', MacGibbon & Kee, London, 1968.

'The Third International After Lenin', Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1936.

'Writings of Leon Trotsky (1939-40)', Merit Publishers, New York, 1964.

page 242

ANTHOLOGIES

'De la Bureaucratie', Maspero, Paris, 1971.

'La Question chinoise dans l'internationale communiste (1926-27)', texts introduced by P. Broué, EDI, Paris, 1965.

'Staline contre le révisionnisme', Sections I, II, III, 'Ligne rouge' publication.

'Staline contre Trotsky', texts collected and introduced by Giuliano Procacci, Maspero, Paris, 1965.

'Trotsky et le trotskysme', Editions Norman Bethune, Paris, 1937.

OTHER TROTSKYIST WRITINGS

AVENAS, D. and BROSSAT, A. (1971), 'De l'Antitrotskysme, éléments d'histoire et de théorie', Maspero, Paris.

BENSAID, D. and WEBER, H. (1968), 'Mai 1968, une répétition générale', Maspero, Paris.

BROUE, PIERRE (1963), 'Le Parti bolchevique', Editions de Minuit, Paris.

DEUTSCHER, ISAAC (1949), 'Stalin', Oxford University Press.

DEUTSCHER, ISAAC (1967), 'The Unfinished Revolution 1917-67', Oxford University Press.

'Etudes marxistes', no. 2, February 1969.

GERMAIN, E., De la bureaucratie (1965-7), 'Cahiers Rouges', no. 3, Maspero, Paris.

Ho Chi Minh, un combattant du nationalisme, pas du socialisme, 'Lutte ouvrière', no. 54, 10 September 1969.

'Intercontinental Press', vol. 7, no. 26, 14 July 1969.

LOWY, MICHAEL (1970), 'La Théorie de la révolution chez le jeune Marx', Maspero, Paris.

MANDEL, E. (May-June 1969), The debate on workers' control, 'International Socialist Review'.

MANDEL, E. (1971), 'The Leninist Theory of Organisation', Prinkipo Press, London.

Manifeste de l'OCI, December 1967, supplement to 'La Vérité', no. 543.

MARIE, J.-J., Des mains tres sales, and Toute honte bue . . . , 'La Vérité', no. 556.

NAVILLE, PIERRE (1964), 'La Classe ouvrière et le régime gaulliste', EDI, Paris.

NAVILLE, PIERRE (1970), 'Le Salaire socialiste', Paris.

PREOBRAZHENSKY, E. (1965), 'The New Economics', Clarendon Press, Oxford.

'Quatrième internationale', nos 23 (November 1964), 27 (February 1966), 37 (May 1969), 45 (September 1970).

Quelques enseignements de notre histoire, supplement to 'La Vérité', no. 548.

'Tesis politica de la COB y otros documentos', UMSA, La Paz, 1970.

WEBER, H. (1966), 'Mouvement ouvrier, stalinisme et bureaucratie', 3rd ed., Paris.

WEBER, H. (1971), Qu'est-ce que l'AJS?, 'Cahiers Rouges', Maspero, Paris.

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ON TROTSKY AND TROTSKYISM

'Cahiers de la gauche préletarienne', no. 1, April 1969.

CRAIPEAU, YVAN (1971), 'Le Mouvement trotskyste en France', Editions Syros, Paris.

DEUTSCHER, ISAAC (1970a), 'The Prophet Armed', Oxford University Press.

DEUTSCHER, ISAAC (1970b), 'The Prophet Outcast', Oxford University Press.

DEUTSCHER, ISAAC (1970c), 'The Prophet Unarmed', Oxford University Press.

FRANK, PIERRE (1970), 'La IVme Internationale', Maspero, Paris.

FIGUERES, LEO (1969), 'Le Trotskysme, cet antiléninisme', Editions Sociales, Paris.

KRASSÓ, NICOLAS (July-August 1967), Trotsky's Marxism, 'New Left Review', no. 44.

KRASSÓ, NICOLAS (1968), Reply to Ernest Mandel, 'New Left Review', no. 48.

MANDEL, ERNEST (January-February 1968), Trotsky's Marxism: an anti- critique, 'New Left Review', no. 47. (N.B. the Krassó-Mandel debate was published in a pamphlet, 'Trotsky's Marxism', an Australian Left Review Discussion Pamphlet, 1968.)

MARIE, J.-J. (1970), 'Le Trotskysme', Flammarion, Paris.

PROCACCI, G. (1965), (ed.), 'Staline contre Trotsky', Maspero, Paris.

'Que Faire?', pamphlet no. 3, UJC(M.-L.) Publications, Paris, 1967.

ROUSSEL, JACQUES (1972), Les enfants du prophète, 'Spartacus'.

CLASSICS

Engels, Friedrich

'Anti-Dühring', Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969.

Engels, Friedrich, and Karl Marx

'Ausgewahlte Schriften', 2 vols, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1960.

'Selected Works', 3 vols, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972.

Lenin

'Collected Works', Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961.

'Selected Works', Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961.

Karl Marx

'Capital', Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1970.

'Die Klassenkampfe in Frankreich', Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1964.

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Stalin

'Concerning Marxism in Linguistics', published by Soviet News, London, 1950.

'The Draft New Constitution', issued by the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, London, 1936.

'L'Homme, le capital le plus précieux', following 'Pour une formation bolchevik', Editions Sociales, Paris, 1948.

'Marxism and the National and Colonial Question', Martin Lawrence, London, 1973.

'The Moscow Trial (January 1937) and Two Speeches', compiled by W. P. and Z. K. Coates, issued by the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, London, 1937.

'Problems of Leninism', 11th ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947.

'Reports and Speeches at the 18th Congress of the CPSU(B)', Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1939.

'Selected Works', Stanford University Press, California, 1971.

'Works', 13 vols, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1955.

Mao Tse-tung

'On the Problem of Agricultural Co-operation', Foreign Language Publishers, Peking, 1967.

'Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung, Foreign Language Publishers, Peking, 1967.

'Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung', Foreign Language Publishers, Peking, 1960 edition.

Talks and writings of Chairman Mao, Translations on Communist China, no. 128, Joint Publications Research Service, China and Asia, vol. 9, no. 6, July 1970-June 1971, reel no. 136.

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ALTHUSSER, LOUIS (1969), 'For Marx', Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London.

ALTHUSSER, LOUIS (1972), 'Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays', New Left Books, London.

BETTELHEIM, CHARLES, Calcul économique, catégories marchandes et formes de propriété, 'Problemes de planification', nos 11, 12.

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BETTELHEIM, CHARLES, Remarques théoriques, 'Problemes de planification', no. 14.

BETTELHEIM, CHARLES (1969), 'La Transition vers l'économie socialiste', Maspero, Paris.

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BETTELHEIM, CHARLES and SWEEZY, PAUL (1971), 'On the Transition to Socialism', Monthly Review Press, New York and London.

'Cahiers de la gauche prolétarienne', no. 2, 1970.

page 245

GARAUDY, R. et al. (1956), 'Mésaventures de l'antimarxisme', Editions Sociales, Paris.

GLUCKSMANN, ANDRE (1967), 'Le Discours de la guerre', L'Herne, Paris.

GOLDMANN, LUCIEN (1969), 'The Human Sciences and Philosophy', Cape, London.

HUSSEIN, MAHMOUD (1969), 'La Lutte des classes en Egypt de 1945 a 1968', Maspero, Paris.

KORSCH, KARL (1932), Die alte Hegelsche Dialektik und die neue materialistische Wissenschaft in 'Der Gegner', no. 11/12.

KORSCH, KARL (1971), 'Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung und an,dere Schriften', Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt-am-Main.

MANCEAUX, MICHELE (1972), 'Les Maos en France', Gallimard, Paris.

MERLEAU-PONTY, MAURICE (1964), 'Signs', Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois.

'Octobre', Revue du cercle de sociologie de l'UJC(M.-L.) no. 2.

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REY, PIERRE-PHILIPPE (1973), Sur l'articulation des modes de production, in 'Problèmes de planification', nos 13, 14. Also in 'Les Alliances de classes', Maspero, Paris.

Rosa Luxemburg et nous, debate in 'Politique aujourd'hui', September 1972.

HISTORICAL STUDIES AND DOCUMENTS

USSR and the Comintern

CLAUDIN, FERNANDO (1972), 'La Crise du mouvement communiste, du Komintern au Kominform', Maspero, Paris.

DESANTI, DOMINIQUE (1970), 'L'Internationale communiste', Payot, Paris.

DJILAS, MILOVAN (1962), 'Conversations with Stalin', Rupert Hart-Davis, London.

FAINSOD, MERLE (1967), 'Smolensk à l'heure de Staline', Fayard, Paris.

GITTINGS, JOHN (1964), 'The Sino-Soviet Dispute 1956-63', Oxford University Press.

GRIGORENKO, PJOTR (1969), 'Der sowjetische Zusammenbruch 1941', Possev-Verlag, Frankfurt-am-Main.

'How the Soviet Revisionists Carry Out the All-Round Restoration of Capitalism in the USSR', Peking, 1968.

KIM, G. and KAUFMANN (1966), 'La Paysannerie et le pouvoir soviétique, 1928-30', Mouton, Paris and the Hague.

LINHART, ROBERT (March 1966), La NEP: analyse de quelques caracteristiques de la phase de transition sovietique, 'Etudes de planification socialiste', no. 3.

MEDVEDEV, ROY (1969), 'Faut-il rehabiliter Staline?', Editions du Seuil, Paris.

POULANTZAS, NICOS (1970), 'Fascisme et dictature', Maspero, Paris. 'Proclamation programme des communistes bolcheviques révolutionnaires soviétiques', Editions de l'Avenir, Lyon, 1969.

page 246

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VARGA, EUGENE (July-August 1970), Political testament, 'New Left Review', no. 62.

WEISSBERG, ALEXANDER, 'Conspiracy of Silence'.

PCF

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'Manifeste de Champigny: Pour une démocratie avancée, pour une France socialiste'.

ROCHET, WALDECK (5 and 6 December 1968), Rapport devant le CC de PCF à Champigny.

THOREZ, M. and GARAUDY, R. (1962), Les Tâches philosophes communistes et la critique des erreurs philosophiques de Stalin, Supplement to 'Cahiers du Communisme', nos 7-8.

China

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BABY, JEAN (1966), 'La Grande Controverse sino-sovietique', Grasset, Paris.

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page 247

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HSÜEN MU-CHIA, HEÜEH MU-CHIAO and others (1960), 'The Socialist Transformation of the National Economy in China', China Knowledge Series, Foreign Language Publishers, Peking.

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